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Abstract 
The paper evaluates the impact of corporate governance on the Loan 
Loss Provisions (LLPs) of banks. Linear regression model is applied 
on a strongly balanced panel data obtained from eighteen 
commercial banks of Pakistan for the years 2011-2016. The study 
considers several corporate governance mechanisms such as 
independent directors, board of directors, Chairman-CEO duality, 
attendance in board meetings etc. and takes LLPs as proxy for credit 
risk. Our findings suggest that with reference to Pakistani banks, 
corporate governance does have an influence on loan loss 
provisioning. The results clearly indicate that larger boards in 
Pakistani banks provide ineffective governance through increased 
loan loss provisioning, while independent directors and director 
attendance at meetings do not seem to matter. On the other hand 
where one strong family member dominates, the CEO-Chairman 
duality appears to induce a reduction in the percentage of LLPs and 
therefore causes decreases in credit risk. This reflects that the 
separation of these two positions could lead to higher accountability 
and responsibility, where there is higher transparency with 
segregation of duties. The paper concludes that effective corporate 
governance plays an important role in credit risk management in 
banks and recommends that regulations are needed to further 
endorse the validity of CEO-Chairman duality in Pakistan. 
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Introduction 
Corporate Governance (CG) refers to the particular set of policies, 
customs and frameworks that are difficult to ignore in this modern era of 
banking, characterized by significant credit risk that decides the 
continuity of smooth banking operations. Pakistan is a developing 
country and its advancement depends on the existence of a healthy 
banking sector which can sustain a much larger default risk as compared 
to developed countries. The incorporation of risk is only possible by 
efficient risk management and proper inclusion of non-performing loans 
as emphasized by the State Bank of Pakistan (Haneef, Rana, Ramzan, 
Rana, Ishaq & Karim, 2012). Loan loss provision which accounts for 
credit risk is a good measure to recognize the variation in the credit 
worthiness of lenders; hence, there is an urgent need of its recognition as 
a prudent measure of risk management. CG suggests best practices that 
support transparency, accountability and proper disclosure (Samak, 
Helmy El Said, & Abd El Latif, 2014) which are fruitful for growth of 
the banking sector or any other sector. Thus, there must exist an 
association between LLP recognition and CG best practices which is 
worth studying with reference to Pakistani commercial banks. 
CG best practices help in directing and controlling a company in 
the best interest of shareholders and stakeholders since CG involves 
decision making and its implementation. Due to the CG best practices, 
financial institutions become more accountable in terms of their 
responsibility towards their owners because their control rests with the 
management due to change in ownership and control (Shleifer & 
Wishny, 2012). 
Fairness and transparency are the basic requirements that are 
demanded by depositors with reference to Pakistani commercial banks 
as these banks are mostly highly leveraged (JCR-VIS Credit Rating 
Company Limited, 2016) and use borrowed money of their depositors for 
lending purposes, thus remain accountable to them. With reference to 
Pakistan, there is still ample room for the CG best practices to gain 
strength with increasing transparency, accountability and fairness, 
globally. 
State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), the sole regulator of the Pakistani 
banking sector, has introduced a number of noteworthy measures to 
promote CG and has enabled these key institutions to promote economic 
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development by strengthening their positions. These measures include 
frequent directors’ meetings, encouragement to set up committees for; 
risk management, audit, compensation and nomination, and encouraging 
directors to continue their professional development related to their job. 
The separation of the positions of Chairman and CEO and the 
appointment of independent directors on the board are some key 
measures taken by the State Bank of Pakistan towards the 
implementation of corporate governance reforms (Akhtar, 2008). 
The SBP is responsible for issuance of the prudential regulations 
framework for the banking sector. This framework acts as a guiding 
principle for banks by incorporating international improvements and 
regulations. Prudential regulations also states the provisioning 
requirements in the accounts toward the credit risk which is faced by 
commercial banks (Arby, 2004). 
LLPs which represent credit risk provisioning are a cushion to 
absorb shocks related to advances made to the customers. Thus the 
provisions that are based on managerial decisions also act as a safeguard 
for the depositors’ money and investments of the shareholders. As CG 
emphasizes proper disclosures of provisions for enhanced transparency, 
therefore, commercial banks of Pakistan are bound to adhere to the 
provisioning requirements mentioned in the prudential regulations ( State 
Bank of Pakistan, 2017) against loans and advances. 
Past studies have explored CG in response to credit risk and have 
found an inverse relationship exists between them. According to our 
knowledge, there is no study on the relationship in Pakistani commercial 
banks. So, this study aims to identify the influence of CG on the loan loss 
provisioning practices with reference to Pakistani commercial banks. 
The variables selected to capture the effects of CG include independent 
directors on board, board attendance and Chairman-CEO duality. These 
are independent variables while Loan Loss Provision (LLP) remains the 
dependent variable and proxy for credit risk. This study tests the effects 
of CG on provisions made against the advances and loans provided by 
Pakistani commercial banks based on the annual report data of eighteen 
banks from 2011 to 2016. 
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2. Literature Review 
The most recent study of CG and credit risk was conducted on randomly 
selected 305 non-financial firms (Mudekereza, 2017). Credit risk was 
measured using credit rating while CG was measured using CEO’s 
incentive compensation. The study concluded that firms with lower 
credit rating focus more on incentive compensation. This study used 
credit rating in order to analyze the effect of credit risk as compared to 
our study which is based on banking provisions for advances. However, 
we strive to incorporate a number of variables to account for the CG 
factor. One of these CG variables is board of directors which is 
significant in terms of risk management. According to Faleye and 
Krishnan (2017), banks with effective boards are more likely to 
scrutinize risky borrowers and restrict lending towards them, hence 
pointing towards credit rationing with the help of CG regulations. Board 
size and institutional ownership are crucial CG factors in terms of 
Islamic banking as well. Albassam and Ntim (2017) found positive 
association of board size and negative association of block ownership 
with voluntary governance disclosures. It was also found that Islamic 
banks are more able to sustain risk due to their CG structure in contrast 
to conventional banks (Mollah, Hassan, Al-Farooque & Mobarek, 
2017).o 
Similar variables were used in a study that highlighted the CG 
mechanism and regulations by the Reserve Bank of India in terms of 
credit risk faced by the public sector banks of India. The study is similar 
to our study in terms of variables, but our study focuses on the 
commercial banks of Pakistan due to their deep involvement in advances 
for which LLPs are maintained, which is our dependent variable. The 
study used a sample of 26 Indian public banks and proved that there is a 
significant relationship of CG with LLPs (Layola, Sophia & Anita, 
2016). 
The study by Switzer and Wang (2013) analyzed the relationship 
between credit risk and CG from the perspective of creditors by taking 
into account commercial and savings banks in the US. Their results 
showed that the CG mechanism affects the commercial banks more as 
compared to the savings banks, which supports our rationale for 
choosing commercial banks of Pakistan for our study. Their study also 
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suggested that banks with larger board size and older CFOs have a lower 
level of credit risk. 
The composition of board and its members are a good measure 
of CG practices since these factors are widely incorporated by a number 
of scholars in their studies related to CG. Similarly, we have also used 
board size and independent directors on board as our CG variables. 
Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) studied the performance of those 
financial firms which were most affected during 2008-2009 due to 
financial crisis and they found that the firms with more institutional 
owners and independent directors had utilized a risk-taking strategy prior 
to crisis which lead to heavier losses during the crisis. Overall, the 
authors suggested the existence of correlation between a firm’s 
performance and CG due to risk taking and financing policies. 
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 raised a number of concerns 
related to top management of banks and in this regard considerable 
literature is available. During the crisis survival of banks was doubtful. 
However, the existence of strong CG mechanisms in some of the 
financial institutions enabled them to sustain those shocks. Likewise the 
study by Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2012) found that the financial 
institutions with their Chief Risk Officer (CRO) reporting to the board 
rather than to the CEO, had depicted comparatively higher ROE and 
stock returns in the crisis period. 
Also, many scholars highlighted agency problem as a reason for 
poor CG mechanisms which resulted in ineffective risk management 
systems. Lang and Jagtiani (2010) also suggested that modern risk 
management systems would have identified the anomaly which 
contributed to the crisis at that time. This signifies the importance of CG 
for effective risk management of banks.  
Mudekereza (2017) measured credit risk with the credit ratings 
of financial institutions. Correspondingly, Ashbaugh-skaife et al. (2006) 
analyzed the effect of CG on credit rating and they proposed that board 
independence is positively related with credit rating. They also identified 
that a weaker governance mechanism can be advantageous for 
management but costly for stakeholders due to its consequences. This 
factor leads to resistance from management though shareholders and 
regulatory authorities emphasize an effective CG monitoring 
mechanism, which is fruitful for the economy overall. 
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3. Problem Statement 
This study aims to address the correlation that exists between CG and 
LLPs according to the literature (Mollah et al., 2017). Although the study 
of CG with reference to LLPs has been conducted on other countries, 
however to our knowledge no such study exists which focuses on the 
Pakistani banking sector. 
 
Figure 1. Correlation that exists between CG and LLPs 
Keeping in view the risky economy of Pakistan in terms of 
default risk, it is worth studying the CG mechanisms that play a pivotal 
role in the monitoring of credit risk through LLPs. In Pakistan as in any 
other country, the rules and practices as defined by regulator need to be 
implemented in accordance with CG best practices. 
Unlike Pakistan, the recent paper with reference to Indian 
banking sector also establishes a connection between macro-economic 
factors such as inflation and market conditions with the LLPs which 
reflects the financial strength of banks (Mollah et al., 2017).  
4. Research Question 
In this study we address an important question: 
Does corporate governance play a significant role in managing the credit 
risk of Pakistani commercial banks? 
5. Research Design 
We used the deductive approach to analyze the impact of CG on credit 
risk management of Pakistani banks. The sample population consisted 
of eighteen commercial banks of Pakistan and the data was collected 
from their relevant annual reports. Although collecting data from annual 
Loan Loss 
Provision
Corporate 
Governance
Financial 
Factors
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reports of banks is common, however, to use this data to evaluate the risk 
management efficiency of the bank by incorporating LLPs is truly the 
best estimate regarding the CG best practices. 
5.1. Sample 
The study focuses on the commercial banks of the banking sector of 
Pakistan. The sample consisting of top 18 banks is selected based on 
bank size. Based on their total assets in 2016, the selected banks of our 
study are classified in four groups ( KPMG Taseer Hadi & Co., 2016). 
Table 1 
Criteria for Banks Selection 
Classification Size of Assets (in Rs. Billion) No of Banks 
1 901-2600 6 
2 501-900 4 
3 201-500 5 
4 130-200 3 
5.2. Data and Variables 
Data is collected manually for the years from 2011-2016 from each 
commercial bank’s annual report. The details of variables used are given 
below. 
The dependent variable of our study is Loan Loss Provision 
(LLP), which is a proxy for credit risk, and measured according to the 
ratio of LLPs to gross loans. Gross loans are used because provisions are 
incorporated according to gross loans. The higher the ratio the poorer the 
risk management. 
The first independent variable used to evaluate the effect of CG 
is Board Independence (IND), which refers to the number of 
independent directors on board, since they are in a position to take 
strategic decisions and monitor credit risk. The second variable relates to 
the total number of members on board and is known as Board Size 
(BOD). This variable is used because it plays a vital role in influencing 
strategic decision making. 
The duality of CEO position is the dummy variable (DUAL) 
which is 1 if the CEO and Chairman is the same person and zero 
otherwise. This is a well-known and well-connected variable in terms of 
CG. Attendance variable (ATT) measures the attendance of directors in 
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meetings as per 75% and it is the fourth variable. Director’s non-
attendance shows the inefficiency of the board.  
We also used control variables for our study including Bank Size 
(BAS) which is measured by calculating the total assets of the bank. The 
bigger the bank the more credit risk it will face. Deposits to Total Assets 
Ratio (DTR) shows the liquidity and coverage of loans of a bank using 
its deposits. The next variable is calculated on the basis of the ratio of 
Total Equity to Total Loans of a bank which evaluates the Shareholders’ 
Influence (SHIN), higher ratio means more protection for deposits and 
an increased shareholder confidence. Management’s Efficiency 
(MGEF) is calculated as total expense to total income ratio; the lower the 
ratio the higher the management’s efficiency. It is expected that banks 
would need lesser LLPs considering liquidity, MGEF and SHIN. 
Table 2 
Variables Description 
S. No. Name Type Description 
1 LLP 
Dependent 
variable 
Ratio of loan loss provisions to 
gross loans 
2 IND 
Independent 
variable 
Number of Independent 
directors on board 
3 BOD 
Independent 
variable 
Number of directors appointed 
in a board 
4 DUAL 
Dummy 
variable 
This is 1, if CEO and chairman 
of board are same and 0, 
otherwise 
5 ATT 
Independent 
variable 
Number of directors who 
attended less than 75 per cent of 
board meetings 
6 BAS 
Independent 
variable 
Total asset of the bank refers to 
bank size 
7 DTR 
Independent 
variable 
Liquidity of bank is evaluated 
by Deposit to Total Asset Ratio 
8 SHIN 
Independent 
variable 
Total equity to total loans ratio 
reflects the shareholders 
influence 
9 MGEF 
Independent 
variable 
Total expense to total income 
measures the efficiency of 
management 
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6. Instrument Used 
Regression analysis is used to estimate the presence of the relationship 
between one dependent variable and one or more independent variables. 
It supports the understanding related to changes in the dependent 
variable, also called criterion variable, due to changes in one independent 
variable, also called predictor variable, while keeping the role of other 
independent variables constant. 
7. Hypotheses 
H1: There is significant impact of CEO duality on loan loss provision of 
banks. 
H2: Board size has a significant impact on loan loss provision of banks. 
H3: Attendance of directors in board meetings has a significant impact 
on loan loss provision of banks. 
H4: Independent directors on board have a significant impact on loan loss 
provision of banks. 
8. Analysis 
The relationship of credit risk and CG is assessed using regression, 
which is given by the equation shown below: 
LLP = α + β1IND + β2BOD + β3DUAL + β4ATT + β5BAS + β6DTR + 
β7SHIN + β8MGEF + ε 
8.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
LLP 108 19.4485 1.9864 13.8953 22.7661 
IND 108 00.2947 0.1430 00.0000 00.6667 
BOD 106 02.0374 0.2267 01.6094 02.5649 
DUAL 108 00.5648 0.4981 00.0000 01.0000 
ATT 108 01.6667 1.7721 00.0000 08.000 
BAS 108 26.6666 0.9594 24.5986 28.5502 
DTR 108 00.7341 0.1846 00.0003 00.8857 
SHIN 108 00.0952 0.1265 -00.0258 00.9863 
MGEF 108 02.7160 4.8574 -26.4713 23.6501 
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Table 3 demonstrates the descriptive statistics of data collected from 
eighteen commercial banks of Pakistan from 2011 to 2016. The numbers 
show the minimum, maximum and mean value of the respective 
variables. There is one dependent variable which is Loan Loss Provision 
(LLP) and the other variables are independent. The minimum and 
maximum values of LLP are 13.89 and 22.766, respectively and their 
standard deviation value is 1.98%, which reflects that LLP deviates 
1.98% from the mean value.  
8.2.  Multicollinearity Test 
Below is the VIF table of the variables used in this study. The table 
shows that there is no issue of multicollinearity as demonstrated below. 
Table 4 
VIF Table 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
SHIN 1.61 0.6206 
DTR 1.54 0.6491 
BOD 1.45 0.6577 
ATT 1.52 0.6895 
BAS 1.18 0.8476 
DUAL 1.12 0.8922 
IND 1.11 0.8974 
MGEF 1.05 0.9484 
8.3.  Regression Result 
Table 5 
Regression Results 
Source SS DF MS 
Model 267.7928 8 33.4741 
Residual 153.6837 97 01.5844 
Total 421.4165 105 04.0141 
Number of observation  =106 
F (8, 97)    =21.13 
Prob>F   =0.0000 
R-Squared   =0.6354 
Adj R-Squared  =0.6053 
Root MSE   =1.2587 
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LLP Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
t P>|t| 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval 
IND -00.0283 0.9367 -0.03 0.976 -1.8875 1.8308 
BOD 01.4084 0.6680 2.11 0.038 0.0825 2.7343 
DUAL -00.7029 0.2619 -2.68 0.009 -1.2226 -0.1832 
ATT -0.0362 0.0834 -0.43 0.665 -0.2017 0.1293 
BAS 01.3924 0.1401 9.94 0.000 1.1142 1.6705 
DTR 02.8866 0.8201 3.52 0.001 1.2588 4.5143 
SHIN 02.2545 1.2217 1.85 0.068 -0.1703 4.6792 
MGEF 00.0037 0.0258 0.14 0.887 -0.0475 0.0549 
_Cons -22.4668 3.6614 -6.14 0.000 -29.7337 -15.1999 
The above table presents the output derived from Stata. Regression 
results show 60% impact on dependent variable by independent 
variables. Hence, the appropriateness of the model can be assumed by 
interpreting the significance value which is 0.000, with 95% confidence 
level. 
9. Interpretation of Results 
Our results reflect an insignificant relationship of independent directors 
with LLPs due to p-value of 0.976, though a notable influence is made 
by independent directors on board. 
Board of Directors (BOD) indicates a positive significant 
relationship with LLPs as p-value is 0.038. Large size boards show a 
positive relationship with credit risk with higher loan loss provisioning. 
Chairman CEO Duality (DUAL) indicates a significant negative 
relationship as p-value is 0.009. This indicates a reduction in LLPs with 
the division of these positions among different persons. This supports 
governance stance of segregation of the Chairman of Board from firm 
CEO, results indicate that this duality improves the quality of loans and 
therefore reduces credit risk, evidenced through lower LLPs.  
The p-value of Bank Size (BAS) is 0.000 which is significant 
and positively relates with LLPs due to the fact that the bigger the bank 
is, the more it will be in a position to cater the lending requirements of 
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the Pakistani economy. Hence, the resultant need to recognize LLPs for 
a larger loan portfolio. 
Deposits to Total Loan Ratio (DTR) exhibit a positive 
significant relationship by its p-value 0.001. The higher the DTR, the 
more the liquidity of bank will be. It projects the fact that more liquid 
banks are in a better position to lend and hence they will have to 
recognize LLPs to account for the relatively risky advancing. 
Shareholders Influence (SHIN) is positively and significantly 
related with LLPs at 10% confidence level. This manifests that the more 
the influence of shareholder, the more they would like to have LLPs in 
order to maintain their confidence about the appropriate lending 
approach of the bank. Therefore the positive relationship may indicate 
more conservativeness on part of SHIN. 
Finally, Attendance in Board Meetings (ATT) and 
Management’s Efficiency (MGEF) both point towards the senior 
management and their attitude towards the operations of bank. However, 
we have not been able to prove the relationship of both these variables 
with LLPs. 
10. Discussions and Conclusions 
In spite of no prior study about the relationship between LLPs and CG 
with reference to Pakistani commercial banks, some theories pertaining 
to other economies reveal a relationship between the two. In the context 
of our study, there is indeed an impact of CG on LLPs which we 
evaluated using the mechanisms such as Board Size (BOD) and 
Chairman-CEO Duality (DUAL). The impact of Chairman-CEO 
Duality is in accordance with our predication since, a negative 
relationship of Chairman-CEO Duality with CG shows reduction in 
credit risk with the separation of Chairman–CEO duality roles. Thus, this 
study recommends that regulatory authorities make mandatory for all 
types of banks in Pakistan. 
Based on this study, it is advised that risk management practices 
should be applied properly and supported by an effective CG especially 
in a complex financial sector like banks. A risk management practice is 
the key responsibility of the BOD. Without the board’s support and 
direct involvement, there is no chance to enhance the effective CG 
mechanism and to control the credit risk management practices. 
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Figure 1 reflects the yearly LLPs of banks of Pakistan. This 
shows the individual trend of all banks in response to their credit risks 
measured using LLPs. The spikes indicate higher LLP and hence higher 
risk portfolio. Figure 2 demonstrates mean LLPs of banks. It suggests 
that bigger banks have more LLPs since the larger the bank, the more 
it’s lending will be and as a response the higher the number of provisions 
the bank will recognize. Keeping in view the facts and figures related to 
this study, it is evident that effective CG has a stronger monitoring role 
on provisioning. Hence, the paper recommends that the more the bank is 
involved in lending, the greater is the need to have effective CG best 
practices. 
This research provides guidelines to policy makers. They should 
enforce more stringent policies to adopt CG best practices which will 
result in more efficient credit risk management with security for 
shareholders and a positive impact on the economy. This also adds to the 
social factor of advances and loans which is needed by Pakistani 
economy in order to continue developing. This is possible only by an 
efficient transfer of wealth from surplus to deficit areas, provided there 
is an effective governance mechanism. 
Future research related to this study can be conducted by 
incorporating all the banks of Pakistan, so that the results can be 
generalized confidently, considering the fact that CG does impact LLPs.  
11. Limitation of the Study 
There are some limitations of this study that suggest room for further 
research: 
 Firstly, we collected secondary data of banks for our research which 
is from 2011 to 2016. 
 We limited our sample size to ensure the availability of data as we 
used eighteen commercial banks of Pakistan. If more banks are 
selected then the results should be more interesting.  
 The variable of the Duality of Chairman and CEO is used in spite of 
the introduction of policy by Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan (SECP) in 2013 which clearly mentions the requirement 
of their separate roles. Still, we incorporate this variable to evaluate 
its impact on credit risk as many banks do not clearly impose the 
separation of this role. 
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Figure 1: Yearly loan loss provisions 
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Figure 2. Mean loan loss provisions 
Table 6 
Sample Banks  
Banks of Pakistan  
Habib Bank Limited Faysal Bank Limited 
Muslim Commercial Bank Meezan Bank 
United Bank Limited Soneri Bank Limited 
Allied Bank Limited Summit Bank 
Standard Chartered Bank National Bank of Pakistan 
Askari Bank Limited JS Bank 
Bank Al Habib Limited Silk Bank 
Bank Alfalah Limited Bank Islami 
Bank of Punjab Dubai Islamic bank 
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